The information-centric networking model uses content as the fundamental element, which can be cached and redistributed within the network. In a large-scale, wireless Internet of Things network, this improves efficiency significantly, but also renders many host-centric security solutions obsolete. This article discusses security and privacy challenges in a merged paradigm.
C urrent Internet architecture was designed nearly four decades ago to enable two end hosts to share and fetch content using well-known Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Since that time, the Internet has shown great resilience to the changing requirements of applications. Various protocols and solutions have been proposed to address different user requirements, such as mobility, improved content distribution, and most importantly, security and privacy. However, humans are not the only users of today's Internet. Mobile and wireless smart devices have become active users and contribute to the communication process without human intervention. This new model forms the Internet of Things (IoT). 1 IoT networks are not isolated collection of devices; rather, they are use-case specific and require continuous connectivity to the Internet. Figure 1 shows a generic IoT service structure where predominantly wireless technologies are used to create access-level wireless IoT (WIoT) networks. By integrating IoT devices that can collect/sense data with gateway solutions (applications and customized interfaces) on top of existing infrastructure, a wireless communication model can be achieved. However, wireless communication among edge-level devices is becoming more prevalent, especially in challenging environments such as smart cities, intelligent vehicle systems, health care, smart grids, military, and large industrial sites. The wireless nature of the IoT opens newer deployment opportunities for future smart communication systems and can cater to a diverse set of IoT applications. One can find the similarities and roots of such a communication paradigm in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), which had similar if not identical, goals. This begs the question of whether to use solutions developed for WSNs (in regards to communication, security, and privacy) in the WIoT. In reality, the WIoT is much larger and broader in scope, and WSNs (at best) are a subset of it.
Today's Internet faces unprecedented challenges in many aspects, where user behavior and application design requirements have moved away from connecting two hosts, toward addressing the content itself. For example, a user is more concerned about watching or sharing a video and less with the server it is streaming from. This shift from host-oriented toward a content-oriented paradigm can be realized by information-centric networking (ICN). 2 In ICN, the content is not requested from a host but rather from the network. The content name guides
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the request to any device, which may have a replica of it, thus decoupling the content from its location by using location-independent names. The security mechanisms are applied to the content itself, rather than to the communication channel.
Most WIoT communication patterns, such as sensor content retrieval and mobile content updates (e.g., the humidity value or querying report for a patient), by nature, follow an ICN paradigm, where a device is interested in the content regardless of its location. 3 By decoupling content from its original location, ICN provides a large naming space with various features embedded in it. IoT applications may benefit from in-network caching of content, its hop-by-hop replication, and from availability for reutilization in the core network. ICN aims to provide better content distribution and content-based security as compared to IP protocol. 4 Hence, ICN design would be a suitable solution for large-scale WIoT networks and will improve the ecosystem's efficiency.
Efforts have been made to merge ICN with IoT, 5 but only at a general architecture level. Furthermore, the security and privacy challenges in such a merged system have rarely been discussed in depth. It is important to understand that ICN-based WIoT (ICN-WIoT) security and privacy challenges will be more complex than the individual challenges of WSNs, the IoT, or ICN. Figure 2 shows the various influencing paradigms. The security and privacy in ICN-based WIoT is affected by: 1) the wireless nature of the communication medium; 2) the inherent limitations of IoT systems, e.g., heterogeneity, scalability, services, and so on; and 3) the ICN model's content-centric nature. The first objective of this article is to describe the security and privacy goals of WIoT networks and distinguish them from WSNs. Contrary to common misunderstandings, the communication models for WSNs and the WIoT are different; hence, the security and privacy issues are also different. The second objective is to discuss ICN and WIoT merger issues as well as their existing works and limitations, thereby establishing the dire need for this study. Finally, we identify unique security and privacy challenges for ICN-WIoT networks, then categorize them and elaborate on the challenge and research opportunities present in this domain.
WIoT
To better understand the security challenges for ICN-based WIoT, it is important to first understand the structure, properties, and challenges of WIoT networks. To elaborate on the WIoT, we can use WSNs as a reference model. This is done for two main reasons: 1) One cannot deny the conceptual similarities between WSNs and the WIoT. Moreover, WSNs have been extensively studied and are common knowledge in communications research, which makes understanding them easier. 2) As WSNs have been extensively researched for architecture and security, why not adopt these solutions for the WIoT, i.e., why do we need new solutions? 
Communication Models
Nodes in a WSN are responsible for collecting the sensed data and forwarding it to the gateway/sink using one-way communication protocols or through data mules Figure 3 (a), which are then forwarded to a remote data collection center. Typically, WSN applications are designed and deployed with a specific goal in mind, have well-defined services, and work under a single domain (network and administrator). As a result, they cannot be exploited for others uses, while things in the WIoT can communicate autonomously either with each other or with the Internet. They can sense/collect data, process, take decisions autonomously, and may be under different domains. WIoT applications are more heterogeneous; they are designed for general and dynamic services and can be used for various purposes. Hence, the data collecting and processing services in the WIoT are more complex than WSN applications, as shown in Figure 3 The most significant difference is in the use cases of the IoT, which includes health care, smart vehicular networks, home and industrial automation, and so on. Based on how devices are connected and what type of devices are used, the following classification can be done.
■ Device-to-Device (D2D): Two or more WIoT devices may directly communicate with each other instead of going through an intermediate device/service (e.g., a smartwatch to a mobile phone). ■ Device-to-Gateway: This model is also known as the device-to-application-layer model, where the WIoT device connects with an associated service or gateway that acts as a complete service point. For example, Home Local Gateway may connect with various smart home WIoT devices (such as a temperature controller, security system, and so on) and control them autonomously. Moreover, it may also allow the 
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control of such devices from remote applications on a phone via the Internet. ■ Device-to-Internet: In this model, WIoT devices can connect directly to an application running in the cloud to exchange data and receive control messages, e.g., public surveillance cameras can connect through an access point (AP) to the cloud for communication. Hence, the AP is not a service point (or destination) but rather a connecting point only.
Security Issues
Data protection, information security, and privacy are fundamental requirements for IoT services. 1 The security challenges in WSNs have been extensively studied and mostly classified by the layers in an Internet stack. The main goals of such networks are confidentiality of data, availability of nodes, integrity of information, and authentication and authorization of nodes. The same goals and underlying threats may still be applicable in the WIoT but are not limited to these. In the WioT, devices are heterogeneous, making device security at the physical level an added goal. An increase in the number of devices increases the compromisable points. Furthermore, with heterogeneity, the same security solutions cannot be applied to all devices. They may use different technologies, which can be an added security challenge. The passive monitoring of device communication can create privacy issues. For instance, communication with a smart TV may indicate that a person is home; hence, knowledge of actual data may not be required to invade privacy. WIoT devices run complex operating systems, which are developed by different vendors. Because of the lack of standardization, it is crucial to keep devices patched and updated to guard against new vulnerabilities. This can be further expanded to the reporting of vulnerabilities by users and active updating by vendors. An important objective of this goal is to keep this process automated; as unlike sensor network users, WIoT users can be technically naive and may never understand that a vulnerable node at their end can compromise a larger network.
In the big picture, the WIoT provides a more comprehensive solution to the more personal needs of users. Accordingly, a large amount of data generated by WIoT devices is personal. Most of this data (even if transferred through secure channels) is stored at cloud servers. The IoT is not only end-user devices; therefore, the security of cloud systems becomes an integrated part of the system. Because compromised WIoT devices can put cloud data storage in jeopardy, similar security breaches of cloud servers also impact the IoT ecosystem and user privacy.
Some of the main goals of WIoT security and privacy are:
■ achieving interoperable security solutions, which can be used with multiple physical-layer technologies ■ implementing the authentication of data and devices as part of the network as well as device profiling to identify rogue mobile devices ■ preserving content and user privacy, considering the passive monitoring of wireless communication ■ using encryption technologies to ensure interoperability among heterogeneous devices as well as interference-free and authenticated transmission over the wireless communication medium ■ implementing secure device-update mechanisms by incorporating robust integrity and authenticity checks and minimizing service outage due to security breaches ■ designing devices with embedded security hardware to protect from local tampering ■ reducing computation and communication overhead created by complex encryption and authentication/ authorization mechanisms, respectively.
Integrating ICN Architecture Into the WIoT
In general ICN architecture, communication should be triggered by a consumer node through an interest packet containing the name of the desired content. 6 Intermediate ICN nodes forward the interest packets using name-based routing until they reach a replica node (caching the same content) or the original content provider. Because the content in ICN is decoupled from its location, any node in the network may cache and serve it for future requests. This can reduce overhead at the producer level, avoid the single point of failure, increase data availability, and reduce network load and data-dissemination latency. The response data packet follows the reverse path as interest and is guided by pending interest table (PIT) entries, which are made at intermediate nodes while forwarding interest and removed with data response traversal. The core network aggregates entries based on content name. Packet forwarding is not performed based on the IP address; rather, the forwarding strategy is built on content name and the forwarding interface. Utilizing ICN architecture for WIoT networks is not novel. All IoT devices may become producers and/or consumers, depending on their requirements. The interest packets generated for specific content can be forwarded to neighboring devices or gateway nodes based on the forwarding strategy. The gateway nodes become optimal data-caching points, although caching is not limited to these points alone. Depending on their physical deployment, all WIoT devices may form a physical-layer ad hoc network and participate in forwarding strategy or are connected in a hierarchical structure, with the gateway acting as a sole communication point. In reality, WIoT implementation will be a hybrid of both. As shown in Figure 4 , WIoT devices form a mesh network of different technologies. Mobile and static devices can connect to each other and to APs simultaneously. APs may also form a wireless backbone across the city and integrate smart vehicles into the network. The result is a true collection of things that form their Internet.
ICN-WIoT Benefits
From an information-sharing point of view, the ICN paradigm is an ideal solution for WIoT communication. In, 5 generic reasons are detailed for implementing ICN into IoT systems. A few of the benefits that ICN offers for WIoT communication follow:
■ Scalability: With billions of connected devices, in-network caching and reduced complexity of multicasting protocols will allow the desired scalability. Binding requests to data rather than the device will also reduce the signaling requirements in the wireless domain. ■ Design and Deployment: The simple data-centric model will allow easier consumer-driven application designs with dynamic quality-of-service (QoS) guarantees (based on the content itself) in an ad hoc or infrastructured environment. ■ Devices: The ICN stack has many optimization services (e.g., QoS, routing, dual addressing, multiple interfaces, and so on) as an integral part and not add-on protocols, as does TCP/IP. This enables the design of more energy-efficient, low-duty cycle, compact devices. ■ Mobility and Diversity: Consumer-driven ICN designs and the connection-less transport layer mean that mobility can be efficiently integrated into all applications and devices. Therefore, the heterogeneity of devices, manufactures, and communication technologies will create fewer interoperability issues. ■ Security: In contrast to IP-based systems, security is implemented as a complete layer in the ICN stack; hence, it will be an integral part of communication and not an optional feature.
Integration Efforts
Several efforts have been made for merging ICN and the IoT. Wireless ICN and D2D communication in virtualized cellular networks are addressed by K. Wang et al., 7 and they focus on content caching and sharing between mobile devices but do not directly address WIoT security issues. The incorporation of sensor networks through gateway-based architecture is proposed by 
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S. S. Adhatarao et al., 8 who investigate only ICN-related security issues; their approach is quite limited when the WIoT is considered. Distributed secure content sharing in the Pub/Sub IoT is discussed by R. Li et al., 9 and in that technique, a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption allows only authorized devices to retrieve the shared cached data. A trust model is proposed in S. Sicari et al. 10 (without implementation or analysis) to secure ICN-IoT device discovery, naming, and content delivery. ICN and the WIoT still require tremendous research efforts to become practical, but as leading candidates for future Internet architectures, their security and privacy issues are worth exploring to understand the challenges posed by them.
Security and Privacy Challenges in ICN-Based WIoT
Fundamentally, the WIoT is a multidomain environment with a large number of heterogeneous devices and services. To provide both security and privacy solutions, they must be integrated into the design of the ecosystem. The use of ICN design as the communication model for the WIoT changes most of the fundamental premises of traditional solutions. As the host-centric concept moves to data centric, the solutions which were designed for the Internet stack cannot directly apply to the ICN stack. Figure 5 depicts the differences in both stacks by listing some of their security vulnerabilities; however, this list is only a sample of possible vulnerabilities. The significant change in layers and their responsibilities have led to changes in vulnerabilities and privacy issues, as some of the attacks can now be launched at multiple levels and with completely different objectives. Moreover, without a large-scale deployment of ICN solutions, many of the privacy issues may not yet be visible. Accordingly, it may be premature to list all of the vulnerabilities or classify them based on where and how an attack can be carried out.
In the following sections, we present different aspects of security and privacy challenges faced by ICN-WIoT systems and discuss the possible issues (using scenario examples), existing solutions (if available), and new research requirements. Table 1 presents a summary of this discussion.
Wireless Medium and the ICN
The physical and media access control (MAC) layers in ICN are still under development, and the role of MAC or IPv6 is not clearly defined. It can be assumed that addressing will be limited to neighbor connectivity, while end-to-end communication will be based on content name, PIT, and forwarding information base only. 
Device-Level Connectivity
Most of the existing physical-layer technologies work in some form of hierarchy (i.e., Wi-Fi, where devices connect to APs only, or Bluetooth, which features a master/slave connection, and so on). These models have been developed to support the TCP/IP stack. Exchanging keys to secure communication between two devices is relatively easier. To permit the use of ICN, WIoT devices must allow more dynamic communication among them. Consider a scenario with two WIoT devices in each other's range but connected to different APs: If one requests content that the other has, they cannot receive the benefits of the ICN paradigm because the communication will follow 
Single Interface
The interface of WIoT devices is represented by a single identifier, be it MAC or IP. Using this with the forwarding principle of ICN creates a major security challenge. Consider a scenario where an AP or backbone device in the WIoT ecosystem aggregates interest requests: The aggregated PIT entry maintains a list of all interfaces, which receive the interest requests. Here, all requests will have the same interface, as a single antenna receives them, and, in most cases, forwards them. Therefore, a single malicious response can remove the PIT entry for all of the requesting WIoT devices. This creates a serious security breach and requires a fundamental design change in the ICN model. Possible solutions may include schemes that authenticate neighbor devices before processing their interest/data packets. Another direction is to use a binding mechanism for a MAC wireless address with interest packets in the forwarding plane to track the per-hop flow of packets. The scalability of such solutions is extremely critical because dozens of WIoT devices can be found in close vicinity, and the tracking of all packet flows or the authenticating of all neighbors may not be possible due to constrained resources.
Data Protection
Whenever data are published by a WIoT device, they must be secured. The simplest solution is to encrypt and sign it. Data stored locally can be encrypted by local keys, but this adds to the processing requirements of the device. On the other hand data, once transmitted, must maintain its confidentiality and integrity. 11
Data Confidentiality
The data generated by a personal WIoT device, which may be sensitive, requires proper encryption. The challenge is the key selection. Unlike IPSec, where a tunnel between two hosts is created, in ICN systems, the same data packet can be cached and distributed multiple times. As a result, the consumer or provider is not always known; the key exchange mechanism must address this challenge. In the same scenario, if the data are made confidential, there is a possibility that neighboring WIoT devices can still infer the type, size, and other properties. This information may be compromised by the content name in data packets, which are used for forwarding. Hence, either the names should be encrypted (which itself is a challenge) or nondescriptive names should be used (which is a violation of ICN principles). Consequently, secure, resistant, and distributed-content name-binding mechanisms are essential. The hashing of names can also lead to complex look-up schemes (as compared to prefix matching), which may create a scalability challenge of its own.
Data Integrity
Because the wireless environment opens the possibility of malicious nodes generating fake data, efficient signature mechanisms, which ensure that the data has not been tampered with and are delivered from a legitimate producer or cache, are required. Furthermore, these mechanisms (i.e., data validation or signature verification) must be present at every forwarder and not just at the consumer level. Replay attacks, which require per-packet data integrity, can be a major challenge here. A possible solution can be to generate signatures using time stamp and nonce so that the message cannot be replayed. Moreover, generating signatures for each packet must be done efficiently so that devices which generate new content frequently are not overburdened.
Content Caching
Cache polluting and cache poisoning, which have been studied to some extent in literature but not from an WIoT perspective, 12 are two main concerns. In the following section we classify this problem.
AP Caching Vulnerability
A typical model of the WIoT, shown in Figure 4 , uses APs to connect devices and form a backbone, which makes them prime candidates to become cache stores; however, this also makes it easier for malicious devices to pollute the caches. The content is cached (in limited memory space) based on its demand. Generally, more interest packets for a specific content means more demand, which will force other content (with less demand) to be expunged. Because the identity of interest originator is not known at intermediate nodes, it is difficult to filter requests, which creates fake demand. Moreover, malicious nodes can generate fake content, which APs can cache without knowing its integrity. Integrity checks at each AP cache overburden it, while the lack of checks will allow fake content to reach consumers; this response triggers a flood of interests.
In such a borderless ecosystem, a new business model based on blockchain may prove extremely useful. This business model can be utilized by producers to generate immutable original content; thus, fake content from a fake source can be easily verified. In addition, smart contracts can be used to enforce copyright laws for propitiatory content, which is yet another dimension of security and privacy.
Illegal Cache Stores
Per ICN principle, any device can cache data and provide it to consumers. Content-discovery protocols require a built-in mechanism that determines whether the content is being provided by a trusted store, especially in a public Wi-Fi environment. Moreover, obtaining trustworthy content from an untrustworthy store also requires further investigation. This problem gets compounded by the fact that not all nodes should be allowed to cache. Producer devices may have dynamic agreements with cache points to store data but cannot restrict others from caching. This problem is still open for research, and can perhaps be addressed using smart contracts among devices and content producers. This may not require a complete blockchain solution, but data producers and cache stores (i.e., IoT gateways) can enter into an agreement on caching prior to publishing. This can help to verify a legitimate source of data other than one derived from a producer.
Access Control
Access to devices and access to data are two different issues. Device access should be resolved at the physical layer, while data access requires security and application layer involvement in the ICN stack. 13
Data Access
Access to published content is an existing challenge in ICN but even more so in the WIoT, due to a large number of devices and nature of the content. Data distribution is a lower-layer function in ICN devices, which does not require application involvement. In addition, the cache stores do not restrict access to data; consequently, dynamic mechanisms that limit content distribution are required. Subscriber group-based mechanisms would be useful in limiting data distribution, along with blockchain-based IoT data access solutions. As ICN uses attributes to name/label content, approaches based on attribute-based encryption 14, 15 can be utilized to enable ciphertext-policy schemes for fine-grained data access control.
User/Device Identity
ICN networks focus mainly on the efficient distribution of content; thus, the methods that identify users or devices are left to individual applications. Without such identification, access control will be extremely challenging, and physical-layer identification may not be sufficient for this purpose. Cross-layer functionality for access control also requires consideration. Although ICN is based on the principle of distributed content, identity management will remain a centralized system.
Policy Enforcement
Content-based policies, where each content element generated by a WIoT device has a distribution and access policy attached to it, may be a solution. Enforcing such policies and standardizing them is a difficult task, however, because the WIoT environment is currently unregulated. Dozens of vendors have specialized solutions with little or no interoperability, which makes policy enforcement difficult. The use of smart contracts from the application-layer perspective may enforce policies between entities; however, the implementation of this mechanism would require blockchain or distributed ledger technology to be a part of the overall ICN design. Integrating ICN and blockchain is a major research direction.
User Privacy
Assuming that the content or data itself is protected and distribution is controlled, the privacy of devices/users can still be compromised. By inferring information from the wireless medium, malicious nodes can determine a user's identity and other private information. Content is usually in plain text and self-certified, which can reveal many things, such as the type of content, its size, how often it is requested, and so on. By passively monitoring WIoT devices, an attacker can associate them with individuals, and, to a great extent, determine their behaviors. Encrypting content names may address this challenge but will add to the processing overhead on a per-hop basis. The use of pseudonames in sensitive requests is a suitable solution, but it will limit the human-readable feature in naming schemes. Although using pseudonymous authentication may help with preserving user privacy, such an implementation in the WIoT requires extensive exploration. The IoT and blockchain are hot research areas, however, most solutions are for IoT payment systems. 16 Some major directions concerning blockchain are: 1) ICN integration with blockchain; 2) reduced computation requirements for IoT devices; and 3) reduced blockchain communication for wireless devices.
Encryption and Cryptography
In light of the aforementioned discussion, it is evident that encryption will play an integral role in ICN-based WIoT systems.
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Encryption Algorithms
To protect data, signatures, and content names, encryption algorithms will be decisive in the WIoT. Group encryption at the link layer will also be required so that all neighbors can communicate in a group. At the same time, WIoT devices are resource constrained; therefore, algorithms must be highly efficient while providing the required level of security. Symmetric and asymmetric algorithms for the ICN-WIoT also require fresh investigation.
Asymmetric algorithms for encryption may consume more resources, while symmetric algorithms may not be flexible enough to work in an ICN-WIoT environment. This requires a detailed analysis of communication architecture for new encryption techniques. Moreover, there is a need to develop lightweight and fewer resource-consuming algorithms as well as elliptic curve cryptography with resource preservation for lesser complexity.
Key Management and Distribution
One of the major challenges in encryption will be the key exchange methods. Unlike traditional networks where two parties communicate, ICN can have the same content packets delivered to several consumers. Thus, the public-private key mechanism for such communication is difficult to implement without compromising the efficiency of ICN. In addition, WIoT devices will work in groups; therefore, key distribution must be more group oriented and less host specific. New key chain mechanisms for encryption and decryption have been suggested. 9 These are mostly related to the data only, but more efficient solutions are required, such as attribute tree-based authentication, scalable key distribution, and trust management methods, which can secure the signatures and name without creating overhead for WIoT devices or violating ICN primitives.
State of ICN Implementations
There are two main implementations available for ICN: named data networking (NDN) and content-centric networking (CCN). These are designed for general communication networks and not specifically for WIoT systems. Both use similar (not completely identical) cryptographic content signatures for data verification. Each packet contains a signature of name and content as well as information about the key used to verify the signature. This mechanism only addresses one element in the broader security and privacy requirements. Implementing end-to-end secure communication in CCN is discussed in 17 but requires every consumer to communicate individually for keys. This creates additional overhead (especially for the WIoT) and negates the caching and aggregation benefits. Network-layer trust management is proposed 18 to mitigate content-poisoning attacks. This process uses binding rules verified by each node before cache operation, which adds communication delays and overhead. An NDN schematized trust model for data authentication, signing, and access control for consumers and providers is presented in. 19 Trust rules define associations between the content name and its keys, while the trust anchor builds a chain of trust between the consumer and producer and addresses part of the desired security and privacy objectives. Efforts have been made in 20 to port NDN for the IoT; however, this solution does not address the security challenges detailed in this article. I CN and the IoT (predominantly wireless at the device and edge levels) will be two major architectures for the future Internet. ICN addresses the core communication paradigm, while the WIoT defines the pervasive integrated digital world. Both of these platforms have not been widely or commercially deployed, and the time is now to incorporate what the research community has learned from decades of host-centric communication evolution. Security and privacy have been major challenges in the past, and this article addresses the same in a hybrid ICN-WIoT environment. The content-centric nature and wireless domain of the IoT drastically changes the previous designs of security solutions; thus, they should become part of the architecture rather than add-on modules.
